Building Coalitions: The Politics of Housing Supply
About this Session
Time
Wed. 15.04. 16:15
Room
Room 5
Speaker
Author: Heddesheimer, Vincent (Princeton University, United States of America).
WWhy do local politicians fail to expand housing supply even when shortages are severe? Expanding supply provokes immediate opposition from organized residents while its benefits are delayed and diffuse, creating incentives for electorally vulnerable politicians to underbuild. Using panel data on all German municipalities (1995–2023), I show that electorally safe politicians permit significantly more housing, especially the types that provoke the most opposition. An original survey and conjoint experiment of over 6,000 local politicians reveals the mechanism: politicians are deterred above all by community opposition and fiscal costs, and while they recognize that supply expansion works, they perceive that voters prefer visible short-term alternatives, tilting the political calculus against construction. A US replication using mayoral term limits confirms the finding. These results challenge standard accountability models: in housing, electoral pressure is an obstacle to, not a precondition for, expanding supply.
WWhy do local politicians fail to expand housing supply even when shortages are severe? Expanding supply provokes immediate opposition from organized residents while its benefits are delayed and diffuse, creating incentives for electorally vulnerable politicians to underbuild. Using panel data on all German municipalities (1995–2023), I show that electorally safe politicians permit significantly more housing, especially the types that provoke the most opposition. An original survey and conjoint experiment of over 6,000 local politicians reveals the mechanism: politicians are deterred above all by community opposition and fiscal costs, and while they recognize that supply expansion works, they perceive that voters prefer visible short-term alternatives, tilting the political calculus against construction. A US replication using mayoral term limits confirms the finding. These results challenge standard accountability models: in housing, electoral pressure is an obstacle to, not a precondition for, expanding supply.